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Abstract
When an insurance note is also a derivative a serious problem arises because a derivative 
must be fulfilled immediately.  This feature of derivatives prevents claims processing procedures 
that screen out ineligible claims. This, in turn, creates a perverse incentive for insured holders of 
notes to commit acts that result in payment. This problem first surfaced with CDS contracts, 
which are part of a class of loan insurance I term a default insurance note.
Without an address to this problem, within the average range of returns for a large venture 
capital portfolio, a venture-bank makes less money the better their investments do, in a 
continuous function. The highest rate of return is a total loss, 64% more than a top portfolio. 
Here, a strategy for removing this perverse incentive is defined, consisting of a clawback lien
that returns part of the payment value as a lien on the firm that is the beneficiary of the insurance. 
This is presented as the final major component for implementing a default insurance note system 
so that venture-banking can operate to maximum benefit. Removing the perverse incentive also 
minimizes disincentive for underwriters to deny DIN coverage to new venture capital firms, or to 
those firms that have historical earnings which are below average. 
Keywords: Venture capital, angel investors, seed investors, derivatives, insurance, default insurance 
note, DIN, credit default swap,  CDS 
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1 Introduction
There is a long-standing problem in the insurance industry with bad-faith clients. For 
instance, a suicide will not result in payout of the claim. An arsonist will not be paid for damage to 
property. And a diamond merchant will not be paid for diamonds he fenced on the black market. This 
is dealt with in classical insurance with riders denying claims where the client causes their own 
insured harm intentionally. The denial of claims requires a claim processing department and 
investigators that examine each claim and decide whether a claim will be paid or not, which can take 
some time. 
There is, however, a serious problem that arises when the insurance instrument is also a 
derivative. In that case, the law requires immediate execution, without recourse to the courts. The 
USA's 1982 safe-harbor bankruptcy code provisions were the first to grant derivative holders the right
to immediate foreclosure on underlying assets (Gilbane 2010). The history of such safe-harbor 
provisions for forward, commodity, and security contracts, repurchase and swap agreements is 
founded on necessity. 
Consider, for instance,  what would happen if the holder of an orange juice future contract 
could be held off by court filing. Let us say that the price of orange juice rose which gives the futures 
call option a profit. The owner of the orange juice refuses to honor the call option, sells the orange 
juice to a food company and pockets the difference. This forces the holder of the call option to go to 
file in court, at his expense, and wait for the case to be decided. A smart litigator can draw things out 
for a long time. This would end meaningful trade in futures contracts, thereby destroying the market 
for them.  
Public law 109-8, also known as BACPA, passed in 2005 (Grassley 2005), ensures new 
derivative instruments are treated in the same way. 
I believe that this derivative-classed insurance instrument jackpot problem was first seen in 
the run-up to the 2008 banking crisis. In that crisis, AIG was the underwriter, and various major banks
in the USA were the clients purchasing credit default swap (CDS) contracts for home loans.   
Citigroup, for instance, was accused of lying to investors who bought securities composed of loans.  
Citigroup had bought CDS’s against the loans (Rakoff 2011; Wyatt 2011), and retained the CDS's 
after selling off the loans. When the loans went into default, Citigroup collected on the CDS contracts.
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I have termed such insurance on loans that are derivatives, a default insurance note (DIN) (Hanley, 
2012).
It doesn't take much thought to see that it is quite profitable to make a poor quality loan, buy a
DIN on that loan, sell off the loan, then collect on the DIN. Doing so returns capital, then doubles 
capital when the loan defaults. If half the loans in a bundled security default within 12 months, then 
the overall return is 1.5, or 50% for that year. AIG got caught by that perverse incentive. 
2 Venture-banking overview
Venture-banking is a new concept I have defined that uses underwriting of a default insurance
note (DIN) to insure investments processed as bank loans (Hanley, 2017). The use of the DIN allows 
the bank to book the insured value of the DIN back into Tier 1 or Tier 2 reserves.  I show that an 
underwriter can operate quite profitably on broad venture capital portfolios within a range of 
conventional returns that are achieved by real world portfolios. I also show that venture banking 
dramatically increases rates of return. The primary data source I used came from Ewing Marion 
Kauffman Foundation's 20 years of venture capital experience in banking, as shown in figure 1 
(Mulcahy, 2012). 
The DIN instrument for insuring venture-capital that is administered as bank loans enables 
use of the DIN to take advantage of the multiplier I discovered analyzing the 2008 banking crisis 
(Hanley, 2012).  Unlike the classical banking multiplier1, this multiplier is only limited by the 
1 It is true that the asymptotic classical banking multiplier (1/R where R = reserve fraction) is functionally extinct 
because of the invention of reserve banking. (e.g. Federal Reserve Bank, European Central Bank, etc.). A modern
bank can make any loan it thinks is valid, and settle up on the back end. However, the venture-banking proposal 
is designed to function without requiring access to a central bank except for settlement purposes. 
Figure 1: Kauffman Foundation, 20 years of venture capital returns on 99 funds. 
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regulatory limits on Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital composition. In the venture-banking design, the DIN is 
used as insurance to replenish bank capital. Insuring the loan allows it to be accounted for as Tier 1 or 
Tier 2 capital. This allows each dollar of original capital in the venture-bank to be multiplied by up to 
47 times, without needing to access the Federal Reserve to replenish reserves. The actual multiple of 
the original capital (MOC) can vary from 2 to 47. In my modeling I chose a low of 30 and a high of 
43 as the normal MOC values. An MOC of 43 still provides significant headroom in a crisis. For more
conservative venture-bank managers, an MOC of 30 still provides excellent returns while maintaining
over 50% potential reserve capital. 
The core of the venture-banking  design is that the venture bank pays some premium per the 
dollar of insured loan per year (5% in my modeling), and at closeout, the underwriter receives a large 
share of the investment equity value, either as stock or cash (50% in my modeling). I do not allow for 
bankers to purchase multiples of the loan value, nor multiple DINs using the same loan. This latter 
would be considered fraud. 
In the venture-bank system an individual venture capital fund would put their money into a 
venture bank utility (VBU), which would take care of bank operations for the fund as shown. 
Figure 2: Proposed venture capital banking system. Venture bank utility (VBU) is 
paired with an underwriter issuing default insurance notes (DINs).The clients of 
the VBU are venture capital firms. 
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3 The jackpot problem with venture banking
Figures 3 and 4 show the respective profitability of the venture-bank versus the DIN 
underwriter in stark terms. The optimum strategy for the venture-bank in the region of normal returns 
is to ensure that all the investments fail.  
The returns for DIN underwriters increase dramatically between 1.50 and 2.27, and some 
individual venture funds would be in that region. The Kauffman data of figure 1 shows returns up to 
8.0. This is impossible to graph beyond a total conventional return of approximately 2.27, because 
Figure 3:  5% DIN premium and 50% equity for 100% DIN coverage. Shows
net 10 year total return varying what the return of a conventional portfolio 
would have been. Shading indicates normal range of returns. Break-even at 
1.0 on the Y axis. 
Figure 4: DIN underwriter's return. Break even = 0 on the Y axis. Shading indicates 
normal range of returns. 
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between 2.27 and 2.28, the underwriters no longer have any invested funds. So percentages and 
fractional returns become meaningless. Instead,  it is only possible to graph the earnings per dollar of 
insured capital. 
Similarly, the returns for venture-banks can rise above the 29X maximum that an insured 
would receive from taking all their investments to zero. 
For the bank as a whole, and underwriting as a whole, it is unlikely that returns above 1.50  
would be seen. However, there are venture capital firms that have outstanding returns as reported by 
Kauffman data. Venture capitalists are gamblers to a significant extent, so it could be that using this 
algorithm would end up shaking out the bottom ⅓ to ½ of venture funds. Such funds would no longer 
Figure 5: DIN underwriter return per dollar insured varying conventional return. 
Light shading from 0.9 to 1.5 is the same shaded region as shown in figures 3 and 4. 
Dark shading from 2.27 to 8.00 is the region where underwriters have zero invested 
funds, and no carrying costs. 
Figure 6: 10 year venture bank return for individual venture capital funds. Light 
shading is the overall portfolio return region for the bank as a whole seen in 
previous figures. Dark shading starts where a venture capital fund's returns pass 
the zero point. 
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receive underwriting, thus removing them from future bank returns. This could result over time in 
higher returns for everyone, but that would probably occur at the expense of significantly shrinking 
the pool of available capital for entrepreneurs, which is an undesirable result. I propose a novel 
instrument instead to cure both problems. 
4 Clawback lien attached to DIN instruments 
I propose a novel instrument to combine with the DIN. This new instrument would not, itself, 
be a derivative. It would, therefore, operate through the normal court system if contested. This new 
instrument would create a lien on the ownership of the venture capital firm that would mature over a 
period of months.  However, the underwriter's lien on the firm could be removed by payment of the 
lien's monetary value, or an acceptable transfer of some other asset to the underwriter. 
The lien would increase, month by month, starting from the initial value, at a rate determined 
by the underwriter's terms on the DIN, until it equalled 100% of the value of the payment. The 
purpose of this feature is to incentivise the venture capital firm to return the valuation of the clawback
lien to the underwriter as soon as possible, while also preserving the ability of the venture capital firm
to keep their VBU account in good standing should their reserve needs not allow quick repayment.
 The venture capital firm would normally have approximately 30 days to negotiate with the 
underwriter for alternative payments such as equity share in another investment in lieu of monetary 
payment. The amount of the insurance policy divided by the investment allocation becomes the share 
of the venture capital firm allocated to the underwriter. 
The clawback lien would vary depending on: 
- The cost of the DIN per year; the higher the yearly DIN rate, the lower the clawback. 
- Funds cost for underwriters. The higher the rate underwriters pay, the higher the clawback.
- The structure of the DIN payments, whether flat, front-loaded or back-loaded, as these result in 
some variation for the underwriter.
To set the clawback lien rate will require modeling of these features of the DIN rather than a 
simple mathematical formula. However, I expect that standard sets of contract terms should develop 
rather rapidly, so the requirement for modeling should not be a significant obstruction. 
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Below is shown the results from a model using a DIN rate of 5% per year, a DIN equity share 
of 50% and a clawback lien rate of 62.3%.  
As we see in figures 7 and 8, by means of the clawback lien, the perverse incentive is 
eliminated. The venture capital firm that is using the VBU to make investments, now has a smoothly 
Figure 7: Clawback lien results for underwriter. Break-even = 0. DIN rate 5% per 
year, DIN equity share 50%, clawback lien rate 62.3%. DIN underwriter return 
per dollar insured varying conventional return. Light shading from 0.9 to 1.5 is 
the estimated normal range of total portfolio returns for a venture-bank. Dark 
shading from 2.27 to 8.00 is the region where underwriters have zero invested 
funds, and no carrying costs. 
Figure 8: Clawback lien results for venture bank. Break-even = 1.0. DIN rate 5% 
per year, DIN equity share 50%,  clawback lien rate 62.3%. 10 year venture bank 
return for individual venture capital funds. Light shading from 0.9 to 1.5 is the 
estimated normal range of total portfolio returns from conventional large portfolio
investing.
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increasing profit curve. The DIN underwriter would no longer lose money except at the very bottom 
end. 
The goal of the clawback lien rate model is that when a portfolio for a venture capital firm 
goes to zero, the DIN returns are barely positive, and do not go below zero. In practice, underwriters 
will experience losses in such situations because the venture capital firms will simply not have 
enough assets to cover. But underwriter losses should be minimal. In most cases, should the venture 
capital firm choose bankruptcy court, the DIN liens should be in primary position.  
As a rule, I do not expect that venture capital firms would choose bankruptcy court without 
the consent of the underwriters, because future DIN coverage would depend on a good relationship 
with the underwriters. For the same reason, I do not expect that venture capital firms involved with 
the VBU system would abandon their investments very often when they have major losses. 
5 Concluding remarks
The clawback lien instrument should all but eliminate losses for underwriters insuring 
venture-bank investments when venture capital firms have returns from zero to break-even. This 
clawback lien should prevent discouraging underwriters from providing DIN coverage to venture 
capital firms that have experienced significant past losses, except in the worst cases. Venture capital 
firms composed of new principals should also have minimal difficulty obtaining DIN coverage. The 
clawback lien thus creates robust support for venture capital firms, and hence for entrepreneurial 
ventures, while keeping most losses where they belong – with the venture capitalists. 
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7 Glossary
AIG – American International Group. A global insurance company providing insurance products to 
commercial, institutional and individual customers. They also provide mortgage insurance and 
credit default swap (CDS) contracts. 
BACPA – Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005. For these purposes, 
BACPA strengthened the rights of derivative holders to collect immediately. 
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Basel accords – There are three sets of banking regulations set by the Basel Committee on Bank 
Supervision. These are known as Basel I, Basel II and Basel III. 
CDS – Credit Default Swap. The purchaser makes premium payments to the underwriter and the 
contract insures a loan on some asset, typically a real estate loan. If the borrower defaults on the 
loan, then the purchaser is paid the face value of the contract, and transfers the asset to the 
underwriter. 
DIN – Default Insurance Note.  A proposed derivative that insures loans made by venture capitalists 
as investments, defined in this paper. This DIN contract is they key to enabling this new type of 
banking to function. 
MOC – Multiple of Original Capital.  Some amount of money is put into the bank that is its capital. 
This amount is enlarged by the Basel accords rules into the complete Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital that
is used by the bank as reserves. The total outstanding investments divided by the original capital 
placed in bank Tier 1 reserves is the MOC. See figure 6. 
VBU – Venture Bank Utility. This is a proposed new entity that handles the banking operations for a 
set of venture banks. See figure 5. 
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